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aBstract
Landscape labelling is a new Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) concept that seeks to 
combine elements of PES with product certification at a landscape scales. Landscape labelling 
proposes that managed rural landscapes which deliver valuable ecosystem services be awarded 
a ‘landscape label’, by which products derived from this landscape could be differentiated and 
value added, in the global market. A principal objective of landscape labelling is to deliver 
benefits to communities, rather than individual landowners, based on the continued delivery 
of ecosystem services as evaluated at landscape scales, rather than at the scale of private 
landholdings. In so doing, landscape labelling also seeks to overcome some of the existing 
challenges to the implementation of PES schemes, including evaluating opportunity costs and 
ecosystem service delivery, high transaction costs, difficulties in ensuring conditionality and 
limited inclusivity leading to inequitable distribution of benefits. The global export trade in 
many agricultural commodities derived from tropical smallholdings (including coffee, cacao and 
rubber) offers opportunities for the implementation of landscape labelling that is specifically 
targeted to benefit smallholders within a landscape mosaic. As such, landscape labelling 
would provide management with incentives to continue to meet the ecosystem service criteria 
required for certification. The label, with its associated conditionality criteria, could serve as a 
mechanism for securing additional payments for ecosystem services, which, under a landscape 
certification scheme, would be delivered to community-based organizations for investment in 
community and social projects that would benefit a far wider range of people than is possible 
in the current PES model.
introduction 
New approaches to the management of complex environmental problems have been conceptualised 
within the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005). The concept of ecosystems as 
providers of essential goods and services for the support of human well-
being lies at the heart of the MEA. Ecosystem services are the multiple 
benefits that people receive from the natural environment and include: 
water purification and flood control by forests, carbon sequestration, 
pollination and prevention of soil erosion and sedimentation. Linking 
these ecosystem functions with human livelihood quality provides a basis 
for including conservation and environmentally-sensitive management 
in land-use decisions. How to successfully incorporate ecosystem service approaches within 
landscape management has yet to be clearly defined though. One promising approach is to pay 
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landowners for the ecosystem services that their lands provide. Thus, Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) schemes compensate (or reward) landowners for management that provides 
conservation or ecosystem service benefits to other parties, but which necessarily constrains 
their own revenue-generating opportunities. However, there remain a number of limitations 
that are common to most such approaches, principal among them being a clear definition of 
land-tenure, high establishment and transaction costs, low inclusivity of participation (and 
distribution of reward payments) and limited or uncertain ecosystem service provision. These 
problems have constrained the uptake of PES schemes and further undermined their potential 
in meeting poverty alleviation and development needs that are often concurrent with demands 
for habitat conservation. 
In this chapter, a new concept for PES is proposed that seeks to overcome some of the problems 
associated with the current generation of PES schemes. This approach is called ‘landscape labelling’ 
and it extends existing PES ideas through their integration with the related concepts of product 
certification and which are applied collectively at a landscape scale, rather than the individual 
farm unit (Ghazoul et al., 2009). This approach is described by highlighting its advantages over 
current systems, as well as its potential disadvantages that remain researchable challenges for its 
implementation. The idea is introduced to advance the debate on PES concepts in the hope that 
more effective ways of implementing PES concepts that achieve multiple benefits of conservation, 
ecosystem service provision and poverty alleviation can be realistically developed. As a concept, 
it is expected that landscape labelling will be challenged, refined and even ultimately rejected, 
in the hope that this process will accelerate the development of future PES schemes that are 
able to overcome many of the associated problems, as described below. 
pes and product certification 
PES rewards landowners for management activities that provide ecosystem services. Another market 
mechanism is that of product certification, which seeks to achieve environmental protection 
through market-based mechanisms, such as price premiums or improved market recognition. 
Both PES and certification provide financial incentives to landowners to manage their land such 
that environmental benefits are maintained (see also Chapter 1 “The role of PES in agriculture”). 
PES is essentially a voluntary transaction where an ecosystem service is purchased by a 
buyer from an ecosystem service provider (i.e. the seller). Current PES schemes require three 
steps: (a) an assessment of the range of ecosystem services generated in a particular area; 
(b) an estimate of the economic value of these benefits to different groups of people; and 
(c) the establishment of a regime or institution that is able to capture this value and reward 
landowners for preserving the delivery of the ecosystem services. 
PAyMENTS FOR  
ECOSySTEM SERVICES AND  
FOOD SECURITy
1 7 4
The development, application and acceptance of PES schemes face operational challenges at 
each of these steps, principally in the form of the evaluation of opportunity costs and ecosystem 
service delivery, high transaction costs and difficulties in ensuring conditionality (see also 
Chapter 4 “Cost-effective targeting of PES”). Overcoming these barriers is a precondition that 
can be facilitated by investing in ecological and economic valuation and by building community 
and institutional capacity. Even when these conditions are met, a PES scheme may ultimately 
be undermined by the failure to distribute benefits widely, leading to societal conflicts over 
land use (Pagiola et al., 2007). 
poverty alleviation and eQuity 
The main objectives of PES are usually to secure environmental protection, but some have also 
been developed with the intention of alleviating poverty in rural areas. There are substantial 
challenges to the alleviation of poverty through PES-type approaches (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005; Pagiola et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). At present, the beneficiaries of 
payments derived from most PES schemes are landowners who can enter into 
contractual agreements with institutions making the payments (companies, 
government agencies, NGOs, etc.). In this respect, PES schemes are often 
inappropriate mechanisms for poverty alleviation because they exclude the 
landless (i.e. those who tend to be the poorest of the poor). PES schemes 
often also exclude smallholders due to high transaction costs, uncertainty 
of formal land titles and their limited impact on ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008; Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). 
Consequently, land-based criteria for participation in PES could exclude billions of poor 
people worldwide. Out of necessity, the landless poor are often the agents of environmental 
degradation; thus, they are not only excluded from benefiting from PES schemes, but they are 
also placed in direct conflict with landowners who will seek to retain any financial rewards they 
enjoy under PES, which requires maintaining landscape quality for the continued delivery of 
ecosystem services. Implementation of most PES schemes is, therefore, strongly targeted and 
exclusionary (Wunder, 2008). 
Transaction costs are often the biggest single barrier to participation of the poor in PES 
schemes (Smith and Scherr, 2002; Wunder and Albán, 2008). High transactions costs limit 
uptake to large landowners and exclude smallholders (Wunder and Albán, 2008). Buyers of 
ecosystem services are also disinclined to incur the costs of negotiating with many individual 
smallholders and, therefore, may specifically exclude small farmers from participation (Wunder 
and Albán, 2008). 
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It is also far from clear whether tropical rural communities, be they poor or otherwise, 
actually wish to engage in such schemes or not (Ghazoul, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). PES must 
cover the opportunity costs of participation, which extend beyond income to encompass broader 
assessment of livelihood benefits and risks (Benitez et al., 2006; Ghazoul, 2007a, 2007c; 
Wunder, 2008). Opportunity costs may be high or at least perceived to be so, particularly given 
increasing agricultural commodity prices linked with high demands for food and biofuels (Koh 
and Ghazoul, 2008). Problems associated with insecure land tenure and suspicion of outside 
agencies that offer contracts in return for restricting land-use options are further barriers to 
participation (Pagiola et al., 2007). 
verification
Ultimately, the success of PES schemes rests on their ability to deliver what they promise to the 
buyers of the services. Implementing conditionality may represent a substantial proportion of 
the costs associated with PES and may also exceed local community capacities. Furthermore, the 
reliability of poor farmers as service suppliers may be low if they are unable to exclude outside 
factors. This is particularly likely when tenure rights are complex or uncertain, as is the case for 
many community-managed forested lands in India. Even if the delivery of services from the relevant 
landholdings is confirmed, the former pressure on the services may simply be displaced elsewhere 
(i.e. leakage) (Wunder and Albán, 2008). An alternative to quantified guarantees of ecosystem 
service provision is the use of proxies of service functions, such as land cover attributes (as has 
been adopted by the watershed protection model in Pimampiro, Ecuador) (Wunder and Albán, 
2008), although such proxies must obviously be based on scientific justification of the validity of 
the proxies themselves (see also Chapter 3 “Opportunities and gaps in PES implementation and 
key areas for further investigation”). The advent of high resolution and relatively inexpensive 
remote sensing technologies, coupled with the spread of computer technology and internet 
access even to remote parts of the developing world, particularly India, provides considerable 
opportunities for the development of proxies for ecosystem services at the landscape scale. 
landscape laBellinG
The scientific community is grappling with the challenges of developing locally equitable, cost-
efficient and trustworthy PES schemes. A new PES-type approach, called ‘landscape labelling’, 
has the potential to overcome many of these challenges by: 
 ❉ Combining PES with certification of products derived from landscapes that demonstrably 
deliver benefits through ecosystem services; 
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 ❉ Delivering the benefits of PES schemes to all stakeholders contributing to a successful 
certification process through social and infrastructural investments; 
 ❉ Making available an easily accessible format at the national and international level by which 
relevant information on ecosystem service provision (represented by a ‘landscape label’) 
can be verified. 
Before elaborating on this concept further, it should be noted that landscapes cannot be 
objectively defined a priori as a geographic area with hard boundaries because human-dominated 
landscapes include not only the biophysical components of a geographical area, but also social, 
political and psychological components of that system (Aldrich and Sayer, 
2007). In the context of landscape labelling, the ‘landscape’ is determined 
through agreements among and by the participation of local communities 
who then define the area encompassed within a landscape label scheme 
and, hence, the spatial extent of the landscape itself. What constitutes a 
community also requires definition, although this can only be done once 
the context is understood. Nevertheless, the landscape scale, as interpreted 
here, envisages that several communities would be encompassed, though 
these communities would share a sense of ‘belonging’ to the landscape as they define it. In 
summary, a landscape entering a landscape labelling scheme would be defined by geographic, 
cultural and social boundaries. 
It is proposed that managed rural landscapes recognised to be delivering ecosystem services 
(against relevant criteria and based on local and regional evaluation by appropriate institutions) 
should be acknowledged as such by granting the use of an exclusive ‘landscape label’ that is 
applicable across the whole landscape. A landscape label would represent the delivery of various 
ecosystem services and, thus, be the conduit through which payments for ecosystem services 
are made to appropriate community-based organizations to ensure the continued delivery of 
these services. The landscape label could also be used to identify a good as originating from 
an ecosystem service-providing region, as well as serving to symbolise the wide variety of 
ecosystem services provided by the landscape. A landscape label could also represent and indeed 
publicise the cultural and symbolic attributes of the landscape, as defined by local communities, 
thereby helping to define its heritage value and uniqueness for people beyond the landscape. 
This, in turn, would provide greater recognition to communities and help to empower them 
in negotiations with outside agencies (including government or companies) and also promote 
landscape recognition that could serve to generate new livelihood opportunities through, for 
example, tourism (Garcia et al., 2007).
A landscape labelling approach, therefore, provides a mechanism by which payments 
for ecosystem services are delivered to the community on the basis of effective landscape 
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management, while individual landowners and producers additionally benefit from the raised 
market recognition of their products through the use of the landscape label as a certificate 
of good land and environmental management. Thus, a landscape label 
potentially permits producer communities to improve market recognition, 
secure premium payments, gain access to niche markets and attain market 
benefits for minor products by association through the label with more 
commercially important products. The derived benefits can, in turn, secure an 
incentive for managing the landscape in such a way as to continue to meet 
the ecosystem service criteria required for certification. Landscape labelling 
has many other benefits in terms of reducing transaction costs, improving 
inclusivity and equity, more cost-effective assessments of conditionality, 
allowing more flexibility in response to changing market environments and providing social 
pressure to limit free-riding. It also has several potential problems though, which will be 
explained further below. 
Exploring the feasibility of the proposed landscape labelling scheme and the plausibility 
of the expectations outlined above assumes that ecological, social and economic knowledge 
can be properly integrated, that appropriate community-based institutions are established, 
and methods for easy and rapid verification of ecosystem service delivery and conditionality 
criteria are developed. Each of these issues is explored in detail later in this chapter, but first 
concepts that are somewhat related to the landscape labelling approach but fall short of its 
whole vision are described. 
precursors to landscape laBellinG 
The concept of landscape labelling has been preceded by other approaches that also seek to 
raise recognition of products, services and values generated by landscapes and thereby provide 
pathways for improved economic well-being of landscape inhabitants. Three such approaches are 
described below and the similarities and limitations of such approaches compared to landscape 
labelling are outlined. Firstly, ICRAF’s Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES)1 
initiative is explored, which seeks to make PES schemes available to poor smallholders that 
are often excluded from PES schemes through a lack of capital, knowledge or insufficient land. 
Then, Geographic Indications are discussed, used to differentiate specific types of product 
from similar competitors with which they might be confused. RUPES is most closely associated 
with PES, while Geographical Indications (GI) is more akin to certification; while both have 
1  http://rupes.worldagroforestry.org 
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similarities to landscape labelling, neither go as far as landscape labelling in what they seek 
to achieve. The Biosphere Reserve concept is the most closely aligned to landscape labelling, 
but again differs in a number of important respects. 
community-based pes
Reward schemes based on payments for ecosystem services that target poor smallholders 
do exist, as exemplified by ICRAF’s two initiatives: Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental 
Services (RUPES) programme and the similar Pro-poor Rewards for Environmental Services in 
Africa (PRESA) (ICRAF, 2008). Both RUPES and PRESA highlight social mobilisation, which 
represents community-based action to socially and politically empower communities to engage 
in PES schemes. Community-based institutions should, therefore, include accountability 
of local representation for decision making and conflict management. This requires that 
these organizations are sensitive to gender issues and represent the interests of the poorest 
members of society, as well as being able to reach agreement and consensus over issues of 
conflict. RUPES experience in the Kulekhani watershed (Nepal) has shown that the likelihood 
of achieving broadly acceptable PES systems for smallholders depends on shared perceptions 
of ecosystem services and opportunity costs, on representative community institutions that 
manage the implementation of PES scheme and trust between communities, regional and 
national governments and external actors as a basic condition for negotiated agreements. 
Indeed, conflict between local political parties is the main reason for the current delays in 
the selection and funding of PES-funded projects (see Case Study 9 “A community-based PES 
scheme for forest preservation and sediment control in Kulekhani, Nepal”). Similar to these 
schemes is the Mexican Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services Program (PEHS) 
(Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008), but this differs from RUPES in that it targets legal landholders 
who, while undoubtedly poor, are still better off than the many smallholders with uncertain 
tenure or the landless poor. 
Geographical indications 
A Geographical Indication (GI) identifies a good as originating in the territory, a region or 
locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good 
is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. It serves as a marketing tool, adding value 
to agricultural products creating a unique identity for the products, based on the locality where 
they originate from and acknowledging the role of specific knowledge and natural resources of 
the production process (Addor and Grazioli, 2002). 
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GI was initially developed in early 20th-century Europe to protect consumers by offering 
reliable information about the goods they buy. It was thought that GI could also afford protection 
to producers, by fighting against reputation theft and unfair competition. A second generation 
of GI was extended to foster rural development by maintaining economic opportunities in rural 
areas (see Case Study 2 “Geographical indication (GI) certification in Ukraine”). The third 
and present incarnation of the GI, as adopted and adapted by several developing countries, 
including India, has extended the concept to the environment and the cultural and biological 
diversity associated with local production (Bérard and Marchenay, 2006; Garcia et al., 2007). 
With GI protection, producers are able to command premiums for their products, especially if 
perceived and/or actual quality differences exist, including product differences attributable to 
their unique geographical origin, as opposed to varietal origins (Agarwal and Barone, 2005).
Each of these schemes presents some advantages over existing systems in terms of delivering 
benefits to a wider range of ecosystem providers and providing new opportunities through 
improved product and product locality recognition. Each, however, retains some of the problems 
commonly associated with PES. GI is simply a certification scheme that certifies producers of 
specific goods from locations that give reputation to the product and, therefore, excludes landless 
or smallholders who are unable to overcome the transaction and investment costs to participate. 
GI also differs from landscape labelling in that it offers no payment for any ecosystem services. 
RUPES seeks to overcome such problems by offering PES schemes to aggregated smallholders, 
but landless poor often gain no benefit (although see the specific case of Kulekhani, Nepal) and 
smallholders remain entirely dependent on ecosystem service buyers as they gain no additional 
recognition for their agricultural products though their participation. 
Biosphere reserves
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Biosphere Reserves 
combine a core protected area with zones where sustainable development is fostered by local 
individuals and enterprises. A certification scheme backed by UNESCO confers international 
visibility (UNESCO, 2008). Designation of a locality as a Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO raises 
awareness among local people, other citizens and government authorities of the value of the 
landscape for nature conservation and sustainable development. The biosphere label is often 
also used to market a variety of goods produced within Biosphere Reserves, though this is not 
linked to any verified environmental criteria. Rather, the UNESCO biosphere label is used more 
similarly to that of a GI, though rather than being product specific, it can instead be adopted 
by almost any product marketed as emanating from the Biosphere Reserve (an example of 
this would be cheese from the Entlebuch Biosphere Reserve in Switzerland). In this way, the 
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biosphere label provides publicity for the biosphere region and can be used to promote the 
products emanating from it. Because the label raises the profile of the region and its landscape 
as a whole, it therefore stands to benefit many producers living in the Biosphere Reserve, as well 
as other types of business, such as tourism. There are, however, no coherent mechanisms for 
payments to be made to the community for specific ecosystem services. Thus, Biosphere Reserves 
provide benefits through increased recognition of products and product locality. They are not 
directly or verifiably linked to assessments of the ecosystem services provided by the landscape 
though; however, it is implicit in the designation that landscape environmental quality is high.
tHe additionality of landscape laBellinG
Landscape labelling borrows ideas from each of these approaches and combines them with new 
ideas into a single approach. This approach has many of the advantages of the above-mentioned 
schemes, as well as several additional advantages, but also inevitably has some associated 
disadvantages or obstacles that will remain challenging for its implementation. To assess the 
potential of landscape labelling, its features will be explored in more detail. In this respect, 
eight features that are believed to be advantages over existing PES systems are examined below.
inclusivity and equitable distribution of  
benefits and poverty alleviation
A major constraint of current forms of PES is that they are generally limited to large landowners 
who can provide quantifiable and verifiable services and who can overcome the transaction costs 
of participation. This excludes landless people and smallholders for whom participation is not 
possible due to lack of capacity or because they are specifically excluded due to insufficient 
land size. For example, the Ecuadorian PROFAFOR2 scheme operates only with landowners that 
have a minimum of 50 hectares (Wunder and Albán, 2008). This can lead to problems in that 
the PES may become a source of conflict between landowners and the landless. This can arise 
in several ways (see also Chapter 5 “Social and cultural drivers behind the success of PES”). 
To secure PES payments, landowners may exclude the landless from extracting resources 
from areas that were previously accessible to them. This could lead to leakage in that resource 
users may be forced to extract the resources elsewhere in the landscape. A landscape approach 
will help to detect and prevent leakage from within the boundaries of the landscape, but not 
necessarily beyond its boundaries. 
2  http://www.profafor.com 
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Landscape labelling provides a label that signifies effective ecosystem service provision by 
a landscape, rather than by a single farm and implicitly recognises that landscape structure is a 
function of management and use by all community members (see also Chapter 3 “Opportunities 
and gaps in PES implementation and key areas for further investigation”). It is on this basis 
that payments are made by ecosystem service buyers to community-based organizations. These 
payments are invested into social and community projects or initiatives. Thus, landscape 
labelling provides the potential to secure benefits to all community members including the 
landless poor. While these benefits are indirect, they may be important in providing improved 
access to markets, better education and healthcare, micro-insurance, etc. (Table 8). 
Landscape labelling is also inclusive in that the use of a landscape label is not restricted to 
a particular product, as is the case with GI, but associated with the wider landscape. Hence, any 
product that is derived from that landscape can use the label to signify that it has been produced 
under a management system that continues to provide ecosystem services. This provides benefits 
in terms of market recognition and potentially also price premiums to all farmers regardless 
of the type of product they are producing. Indeed, the concept may be advanced further by 
extending a label to non-agricultural products, such as artisanal commodities or other small 
industries. Theoretically, provided the landscape as a whole continues to deliver ecosystem 
services according to the criteria by which the landscape label was awarded, there is no reason 
why a label could not be used by any kind of industry within the locality. This may even allow 
environmentally-damaging industries to continue their activities, thereby resolving any conflicts 
that might otherwise arise, provided that their further expansion does not undermine the validity 
of the landscape label according to the criteria by which it was granted. 
transaction costs
As noted previously, transaction costs may seriously limit the uptake of PES. Transaction costs 
are particularly important for ecosystem services that can be independently and unambiguously 
delivered and quantified by many discrete landowners (e.g. carbon sequestration). Watershed, 
landscape beauty and biodiversity services can be more easily adapted to smallholder participation 
because the service buyer is forced to engage with collectives of smallholders at a much larger 
scales (Wunder, 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008). Negotiation with many such smallholders clearly 
incurs high costs; the success of the RUPES scheme is in its ability to engage individuals though 
collective action (see also Chapter 4 “Cost-effective targeting of PES”). 
Landscape labelling differs from RUPES and other PES schemes in that contracts are negotiated 
with representative community organizations, rather than individuals, and verification is based 
on landscape scales, rather than on individual farm units. It is expected that this will reduce 
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considerably the number of interactions and, therefore, the costs, although it is possible that 
costs will simply be displaced to the community institutions, which would incur the costs of 
negotiating among their members regarding participation in the landscape labelling scheme. 
Bundled service provision
The opportunity of a landscape approach allows the local communities, buyers of ecosystem 
services (at a range of scales), conservationists and others to identify and value a wide variety 
of services and landscape values concurrently. Once identified, the variety of services can then 
be incorporated into management. This contrasts with current buyers of ecosystem services who 
often target one or a limited number of services (e.g. carbon sequestration, 
water provision, etc.) within a landscape, leading to potential trade-offs 
with other services that are either not recognised or are undervalued. 
Landscape labelling allows for a wide variety of services to be recognised 
and maintained across the landscape, depending on local, national and 
international demands. 
In addition, current PES schemes do not distinguish the appropriateness 
of land for particular service provision. Thus, planting trees may provide 
soil preservation services in some locations, but may be inappropriate 
in wetlands that regulate water flows. Through community participation, an integral part 
of landscape labelling and the flexibility afforded by a landscape approach, a wide range of 
ecosystem services can be incorporated into management that takes account of the appropriate 
distribution of service-providing habitats. 
conditionality
The success of a product certificate is dependent on the trust that consumers place in what the 
certificate represents. If forest cover is accepted as an appropriate proxy for ecosystem service 
delivery, then as a coarse measure of the certificate’s validity an opportunity for self verification 
is provided by widely available software, such as Google Earth™. Thus, remote sensing that 
provides information on changes in land cover distribution could be made readily accessible 
through existing technologies and platforms, by which consumers can verify the veracity of 
any landscape label, at least in coarse terms. Such platforms could also raise awareness of the 
region in general, with further knock-on benefits to producer communities. 
Nevertheless, ensuring adherence to landscape labelling requirements is likely to be complex, 
necessitating interaction and agreement between many individuals, villages and community-
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based institutions. This represents another way in which transaction costs may be shifted from 
the buyers of services (who would otherwise have had to verify service provision by individual 
landowners according to specific contractual obligations) to the sellers, in the form of community 
organizations. Verification by buyers needs be little more than an analysis of remote sensing 
images at appropriate time intervals with occasional ground-truthing, while it remains up to 
the communities to ensure that obligations are being met and conflicts associated with such 
obligations are appropriately managed.
market recognition
A landscape label provides clear recognition of not just the landscape, which would itself be 
beneficial for promoting tourism and other income generating opportunities, but also in improving 
product recognition in the regional, national and global markets. This offers opportunities for 
increasing market share and differentiating products from competitors; it also allows for minor 
products to benefit by association with commercially important products that use the same 
label. Landscape labels, therefore, need not deliver price premiums to be beneficial, but simply 
provide uniform market recognition for a wide range of products. 
community management and social pressure
The success of community-wide schemes is dependent on effective institutional structures that 
provide appropriate negotiation and communication pathways among the variety of community 
organizations. A diversity of community-based organizations and interests is typical of many 
rural landscapes and ensuring effective interaction among such organizations is one of the most 
serious challenges to the implementation of landscape-level PES processes. 
Indeed, the success of the landscape labelling approach rests on the effective 
functioning of such organizations, as well as cooperation between them. 
Payments to support a certified landscape are expected to be made to 
appropriate community institutions that will be responsible for making 
investment decisions. Conflicts between community-based organizations 
and corruption within them are perhaps the most important threats to 
the successful implementation of landscape labelling. Nevertheless, there 
is considerable awareness and knowledge regarding empowerment of and 
collaboration among community-based organizations and examples of collaborative networks 
to secure wider community benefits are known. These include the Model Forest Trust system, 
which in the district of Kodagu has been developed into a network of stakeholders that share 
The success of 
landscape labelling 
depends on cooperation 
between several 
community-based 
organizations within a 
given landscape
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the common goal of sustainable landscape and forest management with a view to preserving 
ecosystem services and local livelihoods (see Case Study 8 “Geographical Indications and 
landscape labelling in Kodagu district, India”).
 
flexibility in decision making 
Another limitation of PES is that landowners are contractually bound to restrict their activities 
on their land and are, therefore, limited in the extent to which they can respond to changing 
commodity markets. This restriction of their management choices makes landowners somewhat 
wary of PES. However, assessing ecosystem service provision at the aggregated scale of the 
landscape allows greater flexibility regarding land-use decisions and allows for development 
when opportunity costs at a particular location are high, so long as this development is offset 
elsewhere within the landscape. This raises the potential for a landscape-wide offset market, 
permitting landowners to offset certain environmentally-damaging activities 
and thereby retain the benefits of landscape labelling. Such flexibility is 
likely to make landscape labelling more attractive to wide participation, as 
there is the recognition that high opportunity costs can be accommodated 
through reforestation or improved forest protection elsewhere within 
the landscape where opportunity costs are lower. This presupposes that 
ecosystem services continue to be successfully provided to the standard 
which is required to maintain justification for the associated payments. 
This is the nub of conditionality, which is itself a prerequisite for a successful PES scheme. 
Thus, offsetting is more likely to work if there is appropriate planning about where development 
might take place such that impacts are minimised and where restoration for offsetting should 
be implemented to maximise resulting ecosystem service benefits. This will undoubtedly raise 
the costs of implementation and the actual degree of flexibility afforded by offsetting will be 
shaped by these considerations. 
inclusion of non-market values and  
local community perceptions 
It is possible that a landscape label could represent more than just goods and services that 
have market value, but also non-market values, including the cultural and spiritual importance 
of landscape features, as well as natural heritage, notably biodiversity. Many tropical landscapes 
are rich in biodiversity that has little direct economic value or may harbour species that have 
local religious or spiritual symbolism, but little significance for buyers of ecosystem services. 
Assessing ecosystem 
services at the aggregated 
landscape scale allows 
greater flexibility in 
land-use decisions at the 
farm level
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Additionally, to avoid conflicts among landowners and the landless it is important that landscape 
labelling recognises local values and local use of habitats (see also Chapter 3 “Opportunities 
and gaps in PES implementation and key areas for further investigation”). If such values are 
incorporated in a landscape labelling approach, it can then serve to minimise or avoid conflicts 
between landowners seeking to protect their forest under landscape labelling conditions and 
the landless who extract resources from such habitats. 
Barriers to tHe uptaKe of landscape laBellinG 
Barriers to the adoption of landscape labels may also include a lack of awareness among the 
farmers about the concept of labelling or ecosystem services provided by the landscape. Producers 
may also not appreciate the importance of PES conditionality, i.e. the need to maintain service 
provision to continue receiving PES payments and to justify an associated landscape label. 
Such barriers, however, are common to all PES schemes. 
There remain several unresolved, or at least poorly resolved, concerns with regard to 
landscape labelling specifically, including dealing with ‘free-riders’, managing conditionality, 
avoiding leakage, ensuring effective functioning of community institutions and dealing with 
disturbances beyond the control of the communities (e.g. atmospheric 
pollution, climate change). Community relations (e.g. between producers 
and other community groups) may become strained as any PES necessarily 
restricts the range of livelihood options available to producers. The linking 
of a PES (that benefits the farmer) to a certificate (that benefits the wider 
community) could improve such relations by ensuring that the two groups 
have common goals. Peer pressure may act to minimise free-riding, but 
may also create and exacerbate conflicts. Opt-out agreements for individual 
landowners allow for flexibility in decision making, but may erode the landscape labelling 
concept if too much flexibility is allowed. Leakage is less likely in a landscape labelling approach 
because the assessment for the delivery of services is made at the scale of the entire landscape, 
although this would not account for displacement beyond the boundaries of the landscape. 
Another important issue that needs further consideration is the decisions that should be 
taken by buyers for ecosystem services under conditions of non-compliance. When ecosystem 
service provision is attributed not to a single individual, but to the entire community, then in 
the event that ecosystem services fail to be delivered the expected course of action would be 
to reduce or stop payments. This raises important concerns regarding the morality of such an 
interruption in that the landscape labelling payments could be providing widespread community 
benefits, including poverty alleviation. 
The landscape 
labelling approach has 
yet to fully deal with a 
number of key aspects 
before it can be adopted 
at a wider scale
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Although not all these issues can be addressed in detail within the scope of this paper, 
nor is it clear how they should be addressed, it is hoped that the description of the concept 
generates discussion that will lead to the development of improved PES systems that provide 
the advantages listed above without, ultimately, the disadvantages that are readily recognised. 
The landscape labelling concept differs from other PES approaches in that it specifies a 
landscape-wide PES scheme and invests funds into community-based projects that have the 
potential to benefit a far greater number of people than might otherwise be the case, yet 
also allows for additional benefits to landowners through product differentiation. Payments 
made to community-based institutions to support community projects (e.g. micro-insurance, 
micro-credit, education and health infrastructure, improved transportation and communication 
networks, etc.) benefit a much wider range of community members, regardless of societal status 
and instigate social pressure acting against free-riders. Additionally, by building capacity among 
community-based networks (such as in the Kodagu Model Forest Trust) and, ultimately, by raising 
awareness of the landscape in the wider social and political environment, it offers possibilities 
to improve communities’ abilities to achieve official recognition of traditional management 
practices and land rights. There are clear benefits over existing PES schemes and yet there are 
also major obstacles to be investigated and overcome if landscape labelling is to make a useful 
contribution in real terms. Through this paper it is hoped that new ideas could be generated 
and a discussion fostered by which PES approaches overall can be advanced and improved.
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Table 8 
comparison of current pes concepts with landscape labelling
pes (sensu wunder, 2005) landscape labelling 
Moderate establishment costs High establishment costs 
High transaction costs borne by  
participating individuals 
Low transaction costs (although high 
transaction costs may be deferred to 
community-level organizations) 
Low equity (participation in PES  
usually limited to large landowners) 
High equity (allows participation by all 
community members) 
Voluntary at individual level Voluntary at community level (individual non-participants effectively become free-riders) 
Environmental quality managed by individual 
landowner (possibly leading to exclusion of 
other resource users) 
Environmental quality managed by landowners 
and community members and mediated through 
community-based organizations 
Service provision at farm scale (aggregated 
units may be insufficient to provide large-scale 
ecosystem services) 
Service provision at the landscape scale 
(encompassing all ecosystem services provided 
by the landscape) 
Relatively few services provided Relatively many services provided 
Little flexibility in land use at farm scale 
(individuals contractually bound  
to limited land uses) 
Large flexibility in land use at 
farm scale, provided criteria are met at 
the landscape scale 
Conditionality verified at farm scale 
Conditionality verified at landscape scale 
through combination of remote sensing and 
ground-truthing 
Financial reward paid directly to landowner 
(limited distribution of PES benefits) 
Financial rewards realized through a 
variety of mechanisms, but mainly through 
community-based institutions for social projects 
(wide distribution of PES benefits) 
Little potential for poverty alleviation Large potential for poverty alleviation 
Values limited to interests of ES buyers 
Potential to encompass many landscape and 
environmental values, including cultural and 
symbolic features 
Independent of community-based institutions Very dependent on effectively functioning 
community-based institutions 
Financial rewards received for provision of 
ecosystem services only 
Financial rewards received for ecosystem 
services and potentially through product 
certification 
Little potential for wider landscape recognition Large potential for wider landscape recognition 
Top-down enforcement of  
individual contractual obligations 
Bottom-up (peer pressure) and top-down  
(ES buyer pressure) enforcement of community 
contractual obligations 
Entirely dependent on buyers of ES for funding Certification offers some independence  
from ES buyers 
Clear boundary definition Landscape boundary definition requires 
negotiation and agreement
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landscape laBellinG in KodaGu district, 
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GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS AND  
LANDSCAPE LABELLING  
IN KODAGU DISTRICT, INDIA
The district of Kodagu (informally known as ‘Coorg’) in the state of Karnataka is a major coffee-
growing region located in the mountain range of the Western Ghats, India. It produces nearly 
two percent of the world’s coffee (Coffee Board of India, 2008), mostly in agroforestry systems 
under native tree cover. The district has 150 inhabitants per km² and despite this high density, 
still harbours important populations of flagship species, such as the tiger (Panthera tigris) and 
the Asian elephant (Elephas maximus).
Before the development of coffee, rice was the main crop, cultivated in terraced fields 
in the lowlands. Adjoining the rice paddies fields were large tracts of wet evergreen and 
moist-deciduous forests. These forests provided farmers with a variety of goods and services, 
for example, the transfer of fertility from forests to farmland in the form of green manure, 
provision of firewood, timber and non-timber forest products. With the development of the 
plantation economy, the rice paddies and the forests became less valuable. From 1977 to 1997 
there was a 30 percent loss of forest cover in Kodagu, while the area under coffee doubled, 
predominantly at the expense of privately owned forest fragments (Garcia and Pascal, 2006). 
Today, coffee plantations occupy 33 percent of the district; the transformation of Kodagu has 
wider implications for ecosystem services, such as biodiversity, scenic beauty and the cultural 
significance of this landscape (Figure 25 and 26).
Four major ecosystem services are provided by the coffee agroforestry landscape: (a) it 
contributes to the ground water recharge; (b) it acts as a carbon sink compared to other 
cultivated land uses; (c) it maintains high levels of biodiversity; and (d) it has aesthetic values 
that are appreciated by a burgeoning tourist population.
Geographical Indications and coffee certification schemes, or even a landscape labelling 
approach, could link sustainable management and environmental benefits of coffee agroforests 
with appropriate remuneration for producers through better access to markets and PES, and 
improve livelihoods for coffee farming communities, while conserving natural resources in a 
major coffee agroforest region located in a world hotspot for biodiversity.
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Case Study 8
GeoGrapHical indications (Gi) in KodaGu1
India protects its origin-based products and associated traditional knowledge through the 
promotion of Geographical Indications, with a sui generis protection system that is looked upon 
as a model for other countries. Conflicts over Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea have created a 
nationwide awareness and, in accordance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement 
on TRIPS, India passed the Geographical Indication of Goods Act in 1999, which entered into 
force in 2003.
The Department of Horticulture of the Government of Karnataka filed an application for a GI 
Coorg orange, which was registered in 2004. The Coorg orange (Citrus reticulata) is an ecotype of 
mandarin. It is a small tree that grows well in evergreen, subtropical, hilly tracts at 600-1 200 
metres above sea level. The Coorg orange was frequently associated with coffee, but diseases 
and lack of interest by farmers who were eager to involve themselves in more lucrative cash 
crops (coffee and pepper) has almost entirely wiped out the crop over the last 50 years. The 
Department of Horticulture has sought to protect and revive the Coorg orange traditional crop 
variety and to provide high quality (disease-free) plant material, bringing economic development 
to the region. The GI is being used to protect the ecosystem where the orange is grown and 
protect the association between the product and its origin locality. 
The GI may have prevented the Coorg orange from disappearing, but it is doubtful that the 
GI on Coorg orange will have an impact on the biodiversity and landscape dynamics of Kodagu 
owing to: (a) the way the GI was initiated, via a government agency speaking on behalf the 
producers, rather than the producers themselves; (b) the fact that the specification was not 
drafted with the objective of maintaining and fostering multifunctionality within the landscape; 
and (c) the lack of local awareness about the GI tool or the ecosystem services provided by 
the landscape.
1  Garcia et al., 2007
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The Coorg green cardamom GI, filed this time by the Spices Board, is also registered and 
suffers from the same drawbacks. As of today, there is no GI on coffee, despite this being the 
most prominent product of the area, with a well established reputation and the geographical 
name being used by private companies to market generic coffee powder.
For a GI to be successful it needs to secure income for the producers and for this it needs 
to be filed or at least appropriated by the producers. For a GI to be successful in protecting 
biodiversity, environmentally-sound practices need to be embedded in the specification of the 
GI. However, choosing environmentally-sound practices entails opportunity costs that need 
to be taken into account lest the GI becomes no longer profitable and, therefore, defeats its 
original purpose.
coffee certification scHemes in KodaGu
Despite the high levels of biodiversity that have been documented in the coffee agroforestry 
landscape of Kodagu, eco-labelling of coffee was absent from the region until 2008. The majority 
of Kodagu’s farmers are smallholders and to source sufficient volumes of quality coffee produced 
in a sustainable manner has been a challenge for any certification scheme. Under the EU-funded 
Coffee Agroforestry Network (CAFNET) project, an initial group of six farmers were certified 
by the Rainforest Alliance and/or UTZ-certified in 2009 and so secured better prices for their 
coffee. Currently, 90 farmers are under review for certification, based on a voluntary process 
led by the farmers themselves with support from the two leading coffee trading companies in 
Kodagu. The cost of the certification is borne by these companies, though the Coffee Board of 
India recently announced a subsidy scheme to encouraging certification programmes among 
growers. The CAFNET project facilitates these activities by helping the farmers document their 
management practices and biodiversity, improve their record-keeping and design internal controls. 
GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS AND  
LANDSCAPE LABELLING  
IN KODAGU DISTRICT, INDIA
Current pages  
(from left to right):
 >State‑controlled forests, rice 
paddies, coffee plantations and forest 
patches constitute the landscape of 
Kodagu district. 
 >Large‑scale conversion of forests 
to coffee plantations has eliminated 
important ecological corridors 
between forest remnants causing 
serious human‑elephant conflict in 
Kodagu district. 
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Figure 25
land cover of Kodagu district in 1977
 Adapted from original map 
by Nanaya Konerira (French 
Institute of Pondicherry)
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GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS AND  
LANDSCAPE LABELLING  
IN KODAGU DISTRICT, INDIA
Current pages  
(from left to right):
 >Heavily pruned forest trees allow the cultivation of 
shaded‑coffee cultivation.
 >Example of a sacred forests near the source of the Kavery 
River in Kodagu district, where one sacred forest is found 
for every 300 hectares, giving to the landscape a strong 
cultural value.
 >Cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum) used to be the main 
cash crop of Kodagu district long before large‑scale coffee 
cultivation was introduced by the British. 
 
©
G
. 
B
al
en
t 
an
d
 G
. 
M
ic
h
o
n
Figure 26
land cover of Kodagu district in 2007
 Adapted from original map 
by Nanaya Konerira (French 
Institute of Pondicherry)
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Case Study 8
landscape laBellinG in KodaGu
Landscape labelling is a concept that combines ideas drawn from PES with product certification 
concepts. Kodagu potentially delivers a wide range of ecosystem services that benefit the 
local, regional and global community and yet is undergoing a transformation that is likely to 
undermine the ability of the landscape to provide these services. A valuation of the ecosystem 
services provided by the Kodagu landscape could provide the basis for a bundled payment 
for these ecosystem services. Payments under such a scheme would be conditional upon the 
continued delivery of the services which (for most services) is a function of the aggregated 
land uses across the landscape and the payments would be made not to private landowners, 
but to community-wide institutions such that the benefits of PES are realized at the community 
level. Because a landscape label implicitly recognises that the appropriate scale for ecosystem 
service assessment is that of the landscape, the recognition afforded by a landscape label could 
be applied to any commodity produced by farmers within the landscape. A landscape label is, 
therefore, not product specific. It also relieves individual farmers from the costs of adoption and 
verification, although such costs would be transferred to the community organizations receiving 
the payment. Such organizations are, however, better positioned to negotiate with ecosystem 
service buyers (companies, NGOs, government organizations, etc.) and secure subsidies. 
Were a Kodagu landscape label to emerge, the Kodagu brand would achieve enhanced 
recognition and increased market visibility through the use of the landscape label as a symbol 
of effective environmental management. Other products from Kodagu could, under landscape 
labelling, legitimately use the same Kodagu brand name signifying their origination from a 
landscape that is delivering a wide variety of ecosystem services. Through this, they could 
gain market recognition by association, as well as recognition of the ecosystem service values 
they represent. Finally, services and specifically eco-tourism would benefit from the increased 
recognition and the standards of quality the label could enforce.
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GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS AND  
LANDSCAPE LABELLING  
IN KODAGU DISTRICT, INDIA
Current pages (from left to right):
 >The homestays agroforestry system is 
increasingly attracting visitors  
from Bangalore. 
 >Honey from Coorg (the English name 
of Kodagu) has a good reputation but, 
without Geographical Indication, most of 
what is sold is a blend of different origins. 
 >Gathering firewood is one of the main 
needs of local people and agroforestry can 
reduce the pressure on natural forests.
Finally, intangible values could be embedded in the landscape label, to reflect the specific 
cultural and religious values attached to the landscape and specifically its sacred forests and 
pilgrimage sites, such as the source of the Kavery River. This would empower local communities 
in their actions to conserve such features in the face of external development pressures (Garcia 
and Pascal, 2006).
Landscape labelling in Kodagu could be implemented through the Kodagu Model Forest 
Trust (KMFT), a partnership of organizations representing diverse groups that have interests 
in the environment and management of the Kodagu landscape. It includes as its members 
organizations representing landholders, NGOs, the Karnataka Forest Department, community 
groups, research institutions. Furthermore, it encompasses groups that represent a variety of 
stakeholders ranging from government representatives, farmers and village representatives, 
as well as scientists and other experts. While it does not yet include representatives from the 
landless poor and tribal communities, there is the potential to develop the network in this 
direction. Hence, landscape labelling payments for ecosystem services could be made to a 
community-based institution, such as KMFT, which would be responsible for the investment of 
such funds in social and development projects and infrastructure to the benefit of all people 
living within the landscape, not only to private landowners.
references
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Case Study 9
a community-Based pes scHeme for forest 
preservation and sediment control 
in KuleKHani, nepal
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A COMMUNITy-BASED PES SCHEME FOR 
FOREST PRESERVATION AND 
SEDIMENT CONTROL IN KULEKHANI, NEPAL
Kulekhani, which in Nepalese means ‘mine of water’, is a 12 500 ha watershed in Makwanpur 
district about 50 km southeast of Kathmandu, Nepal. More than 46 000 people from 8 600 
households in eight villages live in the catchment area. Poverty persists in numerous villages in 
the catchment area and many households practice a subsistence economy based on sloping land 
agriculture (on an average of 0.6 ha of land per household), livestock rearing and the use of 
forests for fuelwood, fodder and litter. Intensive agriculture for commercial vegetable production 
and paddy rice is increasing. Forests, although legally owned by the state, were traditionally 
managed by local communities. In 1957, the government, aiming to protect and increase forest 
cover, nationalised forests, marking their boundaries, restricting access and employing forest 
guards for patrolling them. Ironically, this nationalisation policy led to major deforestation 
partly due to inefficient protection measures and the exploiting attitude of local communities 
who felt expropriated from their forests. Thus, in the 1980s, to try to re-establish some level 
of forest protection, the government launched a national community forestry programme, in 
which the government granted user rights of the forest to a group of households. The community 
forestry programme has been hailed as a success in the country. In Kulekhani, 95 percent of 
the forests are now community managed and forest cover is recovering well. 
In 1982, on the site of the Indra-Sarobar Lake, the Kulekhani reservoir was built to collect 
monsoon rain and channel water from the reservoir to the hydropower plant downstream. Later, a 
second hydropower plant was added below the first plant (Figure 27). The Kulekhani hydropower 
plants now provide 17 percent of the total hydroelectricity generated in Nepal. Eighty percent 
of the annual rainfall falls during the four monsoon months (June-September). Annually, the 
watershed receives between 1 500 and 1 700 mm of rain, but annual variation can be high. 
In July 1993, 542 mm of rain fell within a 24-hour period, resulting in many landslides and 
massive sedimentation in the reservoir. 
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Case Study 9
A hill above the reservoir, that was partially excavated for earth for the dam, was washed 
into the reservoir. The reservoir, designed to have a 100-year lifespan based on projected 
sediment rates, had its life expectancy reduced to a third in a single day!
Given the economic importance of the Kulekhani hydropower plants and the need to properly 
manage the catchment area, the government promoted participatory watershed conservation 
programmes in which local people were employed to build sediment-trap dams to intercept any 
sediment before it reaches the reservoir and adopt measures to control gullies. The government 
planted large pine monocultures on both state forest and village lands and encouraged people 
to plant pine trees on their agricultural terraces by providing farmers with free seedlings.
In 2003, the RUPES programme of ICRAF, in collaboration with Winrock International, initiated 
work to establish a PES scheme between the upland communities in the Kulekhani watershed 
and the Kulekhani hydropower plant. By law, all hydropower plants must pay royalties to the 
government which, in turn, channels the money at various levels to development activities. 
According to prevailing government regulations (the Local Self Governance Act of 1999 and the 
Financial Ordinance of 2004), 12 percent of the government-collected royalties should be used 
in the district that houses the hydropower plant (38 percent is allocated for other districts in 
the development region and the remaining 50 percent is for other development regions of the 
country). Hence, the Makawanpur District Development Committee (DDC) receives 12 percent 
of the royalties paid by the Kulekhani hydropower plants to the government. Usually, however, 
this money would be used as a part of the regular budget for Village Development Committees’ 
(VDCs) projects and the money is not specifically for meeting the needs of upland communities. 
Thus, within this regulation framework, a PES scheme could be established in different ways: 
a. The hydropower company could directly pay a portion of its revenue from electricity sales 
to the upland people for their ecosystem services;
b. The government of Nepal could allocate a portion of its hydropower royalties from the 
Kulekhani hydropower plants to the upland communities; 
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Figure 27
land cover of the Kulekhani watershed in 2005
A COMMUNITy-BASED PES SCHEME FOR 
FOREST PRESERVATION AND 
SEDIMENT CONTROL IN KULEKHANI, NEPAL
Current pages (from left to right):
 >The 7 km‑long Kulekhani artificial reservoir 
collects all the water drained from the 
12 000 hectare Kulekhani Watershed.
 >Terracing permits farmers to grow crops on 
steep slopes on soils that once deforested would 
otherwise have long since washed away without 
such measures.
 >Palung village next to the Kulekhani River, 
which receives water from eight sub‑watersheds: 
Palung, Kitini, Kunchhal, Bisingkhel, Tubikhel, 
Simlang, Nalibang and Tasar. 
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Adapted from ICRAF unpublished report
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Case Study 9
c. Makwanpur district could set aside a portion of its hydropower royalties from the central 
government for the upland communities.
Under the prevailing laws and as advised by major stakeholders, a mediated scheme between 
Makwanpur DDC and upland communities was considered the most feasible option. Based on 
the work of Winrock International and RUPES, in 2006, the Makwanpur DDC passed a regulation 
that specified allocation of the 12 percent royalty received from the government. Known as 
the Hydropower Royalty Distribution and Use Directive 2062, the DDC must now spend half of 
the 12 percent royalty in the hydropower plant-affected area, while the remaining half can 
be used in other areas of the district. The regulation further specifies that of the 50 percent 
allocation to the affected area, 20 percent is for the upstream watershed area (catchment), 
15 percent for the surrounding area (affected by power plant infrastructure) and the remaining 
15 percent for the downstream area (because of reduced water in the river due to the water 
diverted to the turbines). The upstream catchment community, thus, receives a bigger proportion 
of the royalty than the other areas; the money is deposited in the Environmental Management 
Special Fund (EMSF), managed by the DDC. The money can be used to support conservation 
and development programmes proposed by watershed communities. The EMSF is considered 
a payment to upland watershed communities for providing ecosystem services. The EMSF 
received about USD 3 000 in 2006-2007, about USD 5 000 in 2007-2008 and about USD 10 000 
in 2008-2009. The 2009-2010 allocation remains pending though due to local conflict. The 
Makawanpur DDC directive has since been accepted and circulated by the government to be 
implemented in all districts of the country.
Established with support from RUPES, the Kulekhani Watershed Conservation and Development 
Forum was active in raising awareness amongst local people about ecosystem services, the 
role of communities and the choices made by the government in the previous decades that are 
currently affecting their livelihoods. The planting of pine trees on a large scale in the catchment 
area has been criticised by the local people, as it means there is less fodder for livestock. 
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Protection of young plantations and community forests has also resulted in people switching 
from free-roaming cattle to stall-feeding of their animals and from traditional fallow rotations 
to permanent-field agriculture.
The Kulekhani experience demonstrates that a PES scheme can be issued at the community 
level and is not necessarily constrained by individual choices and land tenure issues. The long-
tradition of forest management at the community level was certainly a major strength in this 
type of implementation. The major weakness was instead related to the indirect payment scheme, 
mediated by a government body (Makwanpur DDC), which has made the project vulnerable 
to local conflicts and political instability. As such, although the local bodies (i.e. DDCs and 
VDCs) were empowered by the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act and the 1992 Decentralisation 
Act, with authority, responsibility and accountability in management and distribution of local 
resources, the current conflict in the use of the available budget is hampering the effective 
ongoing implementation of the PES scheme.
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A COMMUNITy-BASED PES SCHEME FOR 
FOREST PRESERVATION AND 
SEDIMENT CONTROL IN KULEKHANI, NEPAL
Current pages (from left to right):
 >Reforesting the upper Kulekhani 
catchment with pine trees to reduce soil 
erosion has been actively pursued by the 
government, although residents now lack 
enough fodder resources for their livestock. 
 > Intensively cultivated vegetable plots on 
the lowland along the river system.
 >The Kulekhani watershed has a 
population of over 100 000 inhabitants for 
whom agriculture is the major livelihood 
source.
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